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ABSTRACT 
Third-party funding used to be an unknown phenomenon to the 
majority of arbitration scholars and practitioners but, over the past decade, 
the phenomenon has entered the arbitration scene and become subject to 
significant attention. Today, arbitral proceedings may involve 
sophisticated funding arrangements. Such arrangements may promote 
access to arbitration and entail other advantages, but when they remain 
unknown to the arbitrators and the funded party’s opponents, they may 
give rise to a series of practical issues concerning, inter alia, costs and 
conflicts of interest. When a party has raised funding from a third-party 
funder, the arbitrators and opponents need to know about it. A series of 
practitioners and academics have contributed to the general field of third-
party funding in arbitration. They have examined the prevalence of the 
phenomenon and identified the issues associated with it. However, only a 
few have provided practical and operational solutions to these issues. The 
article explains how to solve the issues by way of disclosure. It examines 
the consequences of compelling a funded party to disclose its funding 
arrangements, and it examines how to adopt and construct a duty of 
disclosure in the most feasible manner. The article thereby contributes to 
the development of legal and institutional tools to tackle the issues 
associated with third-party funding in arbitration. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Third-party funding has been subject to attention in the arbitration 
community over the past few years.1 The phenomenon has become 
increasingly prevalent and has consequently given rise to unprecedented 
practical and procedural issues in arbitration.2 Does the existence of an 
unknown funder disqualify an arbitrator? Should the funding arrangement 
influence the allocation of costs and decisions on security for costs? What 
is the accepted extent of the funder’s influence on the funded party? 
Questions as these arise on an increasingly frequent basis in practice, 
and they have resulted in numerous articles and blog posts as well as two 
handbooks and one published dissertation.3 The aim of this article is not 
                                                        
1 See e.g. Jonas von Goeler, Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration and its Impact on 
Procedure (Wolters Kluwer 2016); Lisa Bench Nieuwveld and Victoria Shannon Sahani, 
Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2012). 
In 2013, the ICCA and Queen Mary, University of London established the ICCA-Queen 
Mary Task Force on Third-Party Funding whose work culminated in the ICCA-Queen 
Mary Task Force Report on Third-Party Funding published in April 2018. 
2 Goeler (n 1); Nieuwveld and Sahani (n 1).  
3 Goeler (n 1); Nieuwveld and Sahani (n 1); Nikolaus Pitkowitz (ed), Handbook on Third-
Party Funding in International Arbitration (JurisNet 2018). See also Burcu Osmanoglu, 
‘Third-Party Funding in International Commercial Arbitration and Arbitrator Conflict of 
Interest’ [2015] Journal of International Arbitration 325 ff.;  
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to answer the relevant questions altogether, but to answer a specific 
practical question related to all of them: is it time to make parties disclose 
their sources of funding? A thorough discussion of this question will help 
arbitration institutes and other arbitral regulators develop their rules and 
guidelines on third-party funding in the best possible way. 
First, the article briefly examines the concept of third-party funding 
(section 2). Then, it identifies the existing legal and institutional framework of 
the disclosure of third-party funding (section 3). The article discusses the 
feasibility of duties to disclose third-party funding (section 4) and the 
possible ways to adopt (section 5) and construct (section 6) such duties. 
Finally, the article concludes that it is, in fact, time to make parties disclose 
their sources of funding, but only in particular ways (section 7). 
2. THE HYPE AND HYSTERIA ABOUT THIRD-PARTY FUNDING 
Despite its spot in the limelight, third-party funding is an ambiguous 
concept. To understand the underlying phenomenon and the increasing 
attention it gathers, the concept of third-party funding needs to be defined 
(section 2.1); its recent developments need to be addressed (section 2.2), and 
the compelling risks and benefits associated with third-party funding need to 
be identified (section 2.3). 
2.1. DEFINING THE CONCEPT 
Resolving a legal dispute involves many costs. In arbitral 
proceedings, the parties are required to remunerate the arbitrators and pay 
for their meeting facilities, catering services, and transportation. In 
addition, they might need to remunerate an administering institution and 
a number of experts. Typically, the parties will also need to spend 
significant sums on legal representatives. For the individual party, these 
costs may cause severe harm. 
Generally, the costs associated with international arbitral 
proceedings are considered high. This particularly applies to the losing 
parties, because arbitral tribunals tend to allocate costs based on the 
                                                        
Austrian Yearbook on International Arbitration 2017 (MANZ’sche Verlags- und 
Universitätsbuchhandlung 2017) 12; James Rogers and Matthew Townsend, ‘CIETAC 
Hong Kong Consults on Draft Guidelines on Third Party Funding’ (Kluwer Arbitration 
Blog, 13 August 2016) 
<http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/08/13/cietac-hong-kong-
consults-on-draft-guidelines-on-third-party-
funding/?doing_wp_cron=1594549605.1177089214324951171875> accessed on 12 
July 2020; Aren Goldsmith and Lorenzo Melchionda, ‘The ICC’s Guidance Note on 
Disclosure and Third-Party Funding: A Step in the Right Direction’ (Kluwer Arbitration 
Blog, 14 March 2016) <http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/03/14/the-
iccs-guidance-note-on-disclosure-and-third-party-funding-a-step-in-the-right-
direction/?doing_wp_cron=1594549532.4014689922332763671875> accessed on 12 
July 2020. 
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principle of “costs follow the event” more and more often.4 Facilitating 
third-party funding enables a party to recover a major part of its costs. Put 
simply, a third-party funding arrangement means that someone who is not 
a party to a legal dispute provides funding to someone who is a party to 
the dispute. 
A third-party may provide several different types of litigation 
funding and arbitration funding to a party. A large amount of recent 
literature concerns funding agreements, under which a funder is obliged 
to fund a party’s arbitration costs, and the funded party is not obliged to 
repay the funded amount but is obliged to pay a fixed or variable amount 
in case of a favourable result.5 Such funding agreements constitute a 
narrow definition of third-party funding. 
Other types of funding include contingency fees, under which the party’s 
counsel shall only receive its fees if the party wins the case, and conditional 
fees, under which the counsel’s fees are reduced if the party loses the case. 
They also include traditional loans, under which a lender funds the party’s 
costs against the payment of an interest rate and insurance agreements, under 
which insurers are obliged to cover possible costs related to pursuing or 
defending a claim against the payment of premium. Finally, the funding 
may consist of the transfer of the disputed claim to a third party. All of 
these types of funding arrangements fall under a broader definition of 
third-party funding. 
When it comes to the need for disclosure, one might not need to 
distinguish between the narrow and broad definitions of third-party 
funding. However, the narrow definition concerns a specific, increasingly 
prevalent type of funding. This type of funding is usually comprehensive 
and hidden in a specific case. Due to these characteristics, arbitrators and 
parties need to be able to identify the specific type of third-party funding 
covered by the narrow definition above. 
2.2. RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
Different types of third-party funding have long been accepted and 
widely used in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia.6 In 
international arbitration, the use of third-party funding as covered by the 
narrow definition is fairly new.7 
                                                        
4 Decisions on Costs in International Arbitration – ICC Arbitration and ADR 
Commission Report, ICC Dispute Resolution Bulletin 2015 4 ff. 
5 Bernardo M. Cremades, ‘Third Party Litigation Funding: Investing in Arbitration’ [2011] 
TDM 1, 2; Edouard Bertrand, ‘The Brave New World of Arbitration: Third-Party 
Funding’ [2011] ASA Bulletin 607, 609; Cento Veljanovski, ‘Third-Party Litigation 
Funding in Europe’ [2012] JLEP 405; Osmanoglu (n 3). 
6 Michele DeStefano, ‘Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen 
or Stone Soup?’ [2012] Fordham Law Review 2791, 2819 ff.; Nieuwveld and Sahani (n 1) 
75 and 101. 
7 Maya Steinitz, ‘Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding’ [2011] 
Minnesota Law Review 1268, 1278; Osmanoglu (n 3) 328; Christopher Bogart, ‘Overview 
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Despite its novelty, the use of third-party funding in international 
arbitration appears to be growing rapidly. The increased focus on the 
phenomenon indicates its growing use, but even more so do testimonies 
from practitioners within the field. James Delaney, who currently manages 
the global funding broker TheJudge, has stated that the market for funding 
of arbitration cases “has probably grown by well over 500 per cent since 2012, in 
terms of both the number of completed deals and the volume of active funders looking 
for viable opportunities”.8 Other practitioners have stated that they have 
experienced a similar development.9 
The cause of this development may be the latest financial crisis, 
which encouraged investors to seek new and more predictable markets.10 
The cause may also be the increasing costs associated with arbitration 
proceedings.11 Furthermore, there may be limited opportunities to raise 
other types of funding in international arbitration, while third-party 
funding in the narrow sense is not yet subject to heavy regulation in 
national law and institutional rules.12 
2.3. RISKS AND BENEFITS 
A series of different risks have caused concern about the use of third-
party funding in international arbitration. First, the funding arrangement 
may lead to a commercialization of the arbitration process, ultimately 
                                                        
of Arbitration Finance’ in Cremades and Dimolitsa (eds), Dossier X: Third-Party Funding in 
International Arbitration (Dossiers ICC Institute of World Business Law 2013) 55. 
8 James Delaney, ‘Mistakes to Avoid When Approaching Third-party Funders’ (Global 
Arbitation Review, 15 April 2014) 
<https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1033321/mistakes-to-avoid-when-
approaching-third-party-funders> accessed on 12 July 2020. 
9 Kantor, Mark, ’Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration: An Essay About New 
Developments’ [2009] ICSID Rev. 65; Alexander Brabant and others, ‘Third Party 
Funding in International Arbitration: Practical Consequences and Tactical 
Considerations’ [2016] Int ALR 113. 
10 Steinitz (n 9) 1283 ff.; Valentina Frignati, ‘Ethical Implications of Third-Party Funding 
in International Arbitration’ [2016] Arbitration International 505; Khushboo Hashu 
Shahdadpuri, ‘Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration: Regulating the 
Treacherous Trajectory’ [2016] Asian International Arbitration Journal 77.  
11 The ICCA-Queen Mary Task Force Report on Third-Party Funding (2018) 18; Susanna 
Khouri, Kate Hurford and Clive Bowman, ‘Third Party Funding In International 
Commercial And Treaty Arbitration - A Panacea Or A Plague? A Discussion Of The 
Risks And Benefits Of Third Party Funding’ [2011] TDM 1.  
12 Goeler (n 1) 81; Steinitz (n 9) 1278; Victoria Shannon, ‘Harmonizing Third-Party 
Litigation Funding Regulation’ [2015] Cardozo L. Rev. 861, 870; Aren Goldsmith and 
Lorenzo Melchionda, ‘Third Party Funding in International Arbitration: Everything You 
Ever Wanted to Know (but Were Afraid to Ask)’ [2012] Int'l Bus. L.J. 53, 54. 
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making the process subject to financial speculation rather than a pursuit 
of justice.13 
Second, the funding arrangement may encourage arbitral 
“litigiousness”, thereby increasing the number of frivolous claims and 
unnecessary costly arbitral proceedings that the parties could have avoided 
by virtue of settlements.14 
Third, the funding arrangement may increase the costs associated 
with each case, because the funder and the funded party may be motivated 
to maximize claims and increase the extent of procedural measures in 
order to put pressure on the funded party’s opponent.15 
Fourth, the existence of a third-party funder may give rise to 
conflicts of interest. Due to the funder’s inevitable interest in the outcome 
of the case, certain relations between a funder and an arbitrator may give 
rise to justifiable doubts about the arbitrator’s impartiality and 
independence. 
The funding arrangement may also reduce the funded party’s control 
of the process for the benefit of the funder’s control of the process. 
Having invested substantial amounts of money in the case, the funder’s 
desire to control the process may be significant and obvious. 
Finally, due to the funder’s desire to control the process, as explained 
above, the arrangement may give rise to conflicts and disagreement within 
the triangular relationship between the party, its counsel, and the funder, 
whose individual demands and expectations may be mutually 
incompatible. 
Despite these risks, third-party funding is a beneficial tool in many 
respects. It improves opportunities for parties to pursue their claims and 
thereby promotes access to justice. This advantage does not only apply to 
impecunious parties. Even though a party could afford to pursue its claims 
itself, the funding arrangements can allow the party to transfer some or all 
of its financial risks associated with the proceedings to the funder.16 
                                                        
13 Stephen Jagusch, Third Party Funding of International Arbitrations, in Newman og 
Hill (eds), The Leading Arbitrators’ Guide to International Arbitration (2014) 217; Edouard 
Bertrand, ‘The Brave New World of Arbitration: Third-Party Funding’ [2011] ASA 
Bulletin 607, 609; Goeler (n 1) 88. 
14 Khouri, Hurford and Bowman (n 13) 2; Cassandra Burke Robertson, ‘The Impact of 
Third-Party Financing on Transnational Litigation’ [2011] Case W. Res. J. Int'l L.159, 
171; John Beisner, Jessica Miller og Gary Rubin, Selling Lawsuits, Buying Trouble: Third-
Party Litigation Funding In The United States (2009) 5 f.  
15 Aren Goldsmith and Lorenzo Melchionda, ‘Everything You Ever Wanted to Know 
(but Were Afraid to Ask) – Part Two’ [2012] Int'l Bus. L.J. 221, 223; Stoyanov, Marie and 
Owczarek, Olga, ‘Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration: Is it Time for Some 
Soft Rules?’ [2015] BCDR International Arbitration Review 171, 191; Goeler (n 1) 87. 
16 Victoria Shannon, ‘Judging Third-Party Funding’ [2016] UCLA Law Rev 388, 392; 
Khouri, Hurford and Bowman (n 13) 4; Shahdadpuri (n 12) 82; Derric Yeoh, ‘Third Party 
Funding in International Arbitration: A Slippery Slope or Leveling the Playing Field?’ 
[2016] Journal of International Arbitration 115, 116. 
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The funding arrangements can also equalize the balance of forces 
between strong and weak parties. By providing financial strength to a weak 
party who holds a meritorious claim, the third-party funder can facilitate 
access to justice for a party who would not otherwise be able to pursue its 
claim, at least not with the same force. 
Finally, the funding arrangements may lead to an early assessment 
and determination of the case and its possible outcomes. Typically, the 
third-party funder conducts thorough due diligence before deciding to 
invest in the case. The result of such due diligence may indicate what 
submissions and arguments to focus on and what settlement amount to 
accept. 
Accordingly, third-party funding is generally a useful and necessary 
tool. However, it  entails a number of risks. Arbitrators and arbitral 
institutions need to be aware of these risks, and they need to address them 
through the necessary steps. A strong third-party funder may influence the 
process in a way that satisfies none of the parties’ interests. If the funder 
is unknown to the funded party’s opponent or the tribunal until a late stage 
of the proceedings, the existence of the funder may disqualify the 
arbitrator at this late stage. 
Therefore, the question is: how should these risks be addressed? One 
obvious way to address them is to oblige parties to disclose the existence of 
third-party funders. By making the funded party’s opponents and 
arbitrators aware of the funding arrangements, the funded party can 
eliminate a significant part of the problems described above. 
3. EXISTING DUTIES OF DISCLOSURE 
Only a few arbitration laws and institutional rules currently oblige 
the parties to disclose the existence of third-party funders, and this is due 
to recent amendments in these laws and rules. Under a revised version of 
the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, a party shall disclose the existence 
and identity of a third-party funder.17 The Hong Kong International 
Arbitration Centre recently laid down a similar duty in its rules.18 
Under Article 24 (a) of the 2017 Investment Arbitration Rules of the 
Singapore International Arbitration Centre, the tribunal may order the 
parties to disclose the existence of a party’s third-party funding 
arrangement and the identity of the third-party funder. If appropriate, the 
tribunal may also order the parties to disclose details of the third-party 
funder’s interest in the outcome of the proceedings and possible 
commitment to undertake adverse costs liability. Under section 49 A (1) 
                                                        
17 This follows from section 98T. See also the sanction that follows from section 98 V. 
In 2018, the Secretary of Justice in Hong Kong published the Hong Kong Code of 
Practice for Third Party Funding in Arbitration, which contains similar disclosure rules. 
This Code came into effect on 1 February 2019. 
18 This follows from article 44 of the HKIAC Administered Arbitration Rules that were 
adopted to take effect from 1 November 2018. 
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of Singapore’s Legal Profession Act, a legal practitioner must disclose the 
existence and identity of a third-party funder in international arbitration 
cases.19 
Furthermore, a series of soft law instruments require the parties to 
disclose the existence and identity of third-party funders. According to the 
IBA Guidelines, a party shall disclose “any relationship, direct or indirect, 
between the arbitrator and the party … or between the arbitrator and any person or 
entity with a direct economic interest in, or a duty to indemnify a party for, the award 
to be rendered in the arbitration”.20 Similar requirements are laid down in the 
CIETAC Guidelines for Third Party Funding in Arbitration, SIAC’s 
Practice Note on Arbitrator Conduct in Cases Involving External Funding 
and SCC Policy on Disclosure of Third Parties with an Interest in the 
Outcome of the Dispute.21 
The Danish Institute of Arbitration requests parties to disclose facts 
and circumstances that may give rise to justifiable doubts about an 
arbitrator’s impartiality and independence, including their sources of 
funding. The institute does not oblige parties to disclose the relations, as it 
does with arbitrators. Accordingly, the institute does not impose any 
sanctions on a party’s failure to accommodate the request. However, if the 
failure gives rise to additional costs, the tribunal may impose these costs 
on the party who failed to disclose. 
The rules of the newly established institution, Nordic Offshore and 
Maritime Arbitration Association (NOMA), does not contain provisions 
regarding third-party funding. However, the door does not seem closed 
on this issue. It has been pointed out that there is room to adapt to users’ 
wishes and also, that the tribunal may bear the topic in mind when 
conducting the arbitration “in such manner as it considers appropriate”, cf. article 
15 of the NOMA rules.22 
4. IS A DUTY OF DISCLOSURE FEASIBLE? 
As explained in section 3 above, certain but few legal frameworks 
are obliging parties to disclose the existence and identity of third-party 
                                                        
19 This follows from Singapores Civil Law (Third-Party Funding) Regulations 2017 
section 3. 
20 IBA Guidelines, p. 15. 
21 See the CIETAC Guidelines for Third Party Funding in Arbitration article 3, the SIAC 
Practice Note on Arbitrator Conduct in Cases Involving External Funding articles 5 and 
7 and the SCC’s Policy on Disclosure of Third Parties with an Interest in the Outcome 
of the Dispute. 
22 Jacob Skude Rasmsusen and Jens V. Mathiasen, ’Nordic Offshore and Maritime 
Arbitration Association (NOMA): Could the Nordic Maritime Model Attract a Wider 
Audience?’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 26 March 2018) 
<http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/03/26/nordic-offshore-and-
maritime-arbitration-
association/?doing_wp_cron=1594548296.6015739440917968750000> accessed on 12 
July 2020. 
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funders in international arbitration. Notably, the revised Hong Kong 
Arbitration Ordinance and Singapore’s Legal Profession Act lay down 
such obligations. Is this approach a step ahead? Or is it a step too far? The 
present section will identify the advantages (section 4.1), disadvantages 
(section 4.2), and necessity (section 4.3) of the approach. Based on these 
elements, the section concludes that duties of disclosure are beneficial and 
necessary if designed in a proper way (section 4.4). 
4.1. ADVANTAGES 
If the funded party openly shared its information about its funding 
arrangements with the other parties, the arbitrators and any arbitral 
institution involved in the specific case, it would tackle a number of the 
risks identified in section 2.3 above. 
First, the information would reduce the risk of long and costly 
challenge procedures. In most modern jurisdictions, arbitrators are subject 
to strict requirements about impartiality and independence.23 
Circumstances that give rise to justifiable doubts about the arbitrator’s 
impartiality and independence can make a party challenge the arbitrator. 
The tribunal, institution, or national court may then disqualify the 
arbitrator. If the circumstances arise after the rendering of the award, the 
party may challenge the award before the national courts. 
Ideally, the parties identify any possible conflict of interest, including 
conflicts caused by funding arrangements, before the appointment of the 
arbitrator and the initiation of the arbitral proceedings. As long as the 
circumstances are unknown, the potentially challenging party cannot 
identify the conflict. If the party identifies the conflict and raises the 
challenge at a late stage of the proceedings, the resources spent on the 
proceedings so far may be wasted. 
Second, disclosing the existence of a funding arrangement will make 
it easier for the tribunal to determine the need for security for costs.24 Such 
security may be necessary to ensure the proper remuneration of the 
arbitral tribunal. The existence of a third-party funder may indicate that 
the funded party is impecunious or may soon become so. In that case, 
security for costs may be necessary for the arbitrators to receive their fees. 
                                                        
23  See e.g. LCIA Arbitration Rules article 5(3); UNCITRAL Model Law article 12(2); 
ICC Arbitration Rules article 11(1); SCC Arbitration Rules article 18(1); SIAC Arbitration 
Rules article 13(1); HKIAC Administered Arbitration Rules article 11(1). 
24 See regarding this argument the following: Frignati (n 12) 518 ff.; Kelsie Massini, Risk 
Versus Reward: The Increasing Use of Third Funders in International Arbitration and 
the Awarding Security for Costs (2015) 7 Y.B. Arb. & Mediation 323, 331 ff.; William 
Kirtley and Koralie Wietrzykowski, 'Should an Arbitral Tribunal Order Security for Costs 
When an Impecunious Claimant Is Relying Upon Third-Party Funding?' (2013) 30 
Journal of International Arbitration 17 ff.; The ICCA-Queen Mary Task Force Report 
on Third-Party Funding (2018) chapter 6. The ICCA-Queen Marty Task Force concluded 
that the existence of funding is not generally relevant to determinations on security for 
costs, but examines exceptions that may exist. 
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Third, the disclosure may help the tribunal to allocate the costs 
between the parties.25 This may be the case regardless of the outcome. 
The funding arrangement will reduce the funded party’s own 
procedural costs to the extent that the third-party funder covers these 
costs. If the third-party funder covers the funded party’s entire procedural 
costs, the procedure does not incur that party any costs. Under the rules 
of several different arbitral institutions, the tribunal shall only order a party 
to pay another party’s costs if the procedure has incurred that other party 
costs.26 The funding arrangement may be an important factor for the 
tribunal to take into account in this respect. 
On the other hand, if the funded party loses the case, it might be 
necessary to make the funder cover the winning party’s costs, to the extent 
that this is possible. As explained above, the funded party may be 
impecunious. The funded party’s payment of security would cover the 
arbitrators’ fees but not necessarily the winning opponent’s costs. The 
funded party may not be able to cover the winning party’s costs. If the 
third-party funder has agreed to cover the funded party’s procedural costs, 
it may be argued that the agreement obliges the third-party funder to cover 
the winning opponent’s costs in such a case. 
Fourth, the disclosure may help the funded party to accommodate 
any agreed obligation to keep the proceedings confidential. Such an 
obligation may conflict with the funder’s need for information about the 
case. A strict non-disclosure agreement would prohibit the party from 
disclosing confidential information about the case to the funder. However, 
such information may be necessary for a funder to determine whether the 
case is a good investment and to follow the progress of the arbitral 
proceedings. If all of the parties and the tribunal know about the funder’s 
involvement in the case, they can mutually permit the transmission of 
information from the funded party to the funder. 
The disclosure may entail a fifth advantage concerning the funder’s 
control over the proceedings. As explained in section 2.3, such control 
may be a consequence of the funding arrangement. One may argue that 
the tribunal should be able to limit the funder’s control by issuing 
appropriate measures.27 Without information about the funding 
arrangement, the tribunal cannot issue such measures. 
However, the tribunal may not be able to deal with the funder’s 
control in any event. The control may be implicit and take place behind 
                                                        
25  See The ICCA-Queen Mary Task Force Report on Third-Party Funding (2018) 
chapter 6, where the ICCA-Queen Mary Task Force provides guidance regarding the 
impact of third-party funding on allocation of costs. 
26 ICC Arbitration Rules article 38(1); LCIA Arbitration Rules article 28(3); SCC 
Arbitration Rules article 50; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules article 40(2)(e); CIETAC 
Arbitration Rules article 52(2). See e.g. this argument discussed by Goeler (n 1) 378 ff. 
27 See Elizabeth Chan, ‘Proposed Guidelines for the Disclosure of Third-Party Funding 
Arrangements in International Arbitration’ [2015] Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 181, 299; Marc 
Goldstein, ‘Should the Real Parties in Interest Have to Stand Up?’ [2011] TDM 1, 15. 
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the scenes. Furthermore, there is hardly any compelling reason why the 
tribunal should in fact limit the funder’s control at all. As stated by Goeler, 
the funder’s control is “none of the arbitral tribunal’s business”.28 The funder’s 
control is a private matter between the funder and the funded party, and 
the funder is not a party to the arbitration. The funded party is responsible 
for the funder’s control, and the control primarily affects the funded party. 
Therefore, the funded party, and not the tribunal, is the one to deal with 
this possible issue. 
4.2. DISADVANTAGES 
To make the funded party disclose its funding arrangement would 
not only entail advantages. Any duty entails disadvantages, and a duty for 
the party to disclose its funding arrangement is no exception. 
First, it may be difficult to delimit the duty. There is no clear and 
simple way to categorize the specific funding arrangements that need to 
be disclosed. However, such categorization may not be necessary to make 
at all. If a party is required to disclose any kind of funding, from insurance 
to loans, the scope of the duty will be straightforward. As explained in 
section 5 below, there is no compelling need to limit a duty of disclosure 
to certain types of funding, although certain types of funding agreements 
may be more important to identify than others. 
Second, one may argue that funding arrangements are private affairs 
that the parties should be allowed to keep secret. Parties need a certain 
degree of freedom in terms of procedural strategy, and the funders need 
discretion regarding their investments. Imposing a duty of disclosure 
would indirectly compromise the parties’ need for freedom and directly 
compromise the funders’ need for discretion. However, these needs are 
not compelling when compared to the need for information about the 
funding arrangements. 
Third, disclosure about possible funders may negatively interfere 
with the conduct of the parties and arbitrators. The funded party may act 
excessively risky, and the non-funded party may seek to delay the process 
in order to increase the funder’s expenses.29 The tribunal may base its 
decision on a conscious or unconscious impression that the funded party 
has a stronger case because of the funder’s decision to fund the party.30 
The tribunal may also make decisions on fees, costs, or other procedural 
issues based on its knowledge about the funding arrangement. 
                                                        
28 Goeler (n 1) 143. 
29 Maxi Scherer, Aren Goldsmith and Camille Fléchet, ‘Third Party Funding in 
International Arbitration in Europe: Part 1’ (2012) Int'l Bus. L.J. 207, 218; Osmanoglu (n 
3) 341. 
30  Scherer, Goldsmith and Fléchet I (n 32) 218; Goeler (n 1) 271; Laurent Lévy and Regis 
Bonnan, ‘Third-Party Funding Disclosure, Joinder and Impact on Arbitral Proceedings’ 
in Cremades and Dimolitsa (eds), Dossier X: Third Party Funding in International Arbitration 
(Dossiers ICC Institute of World Business Law 2013) 79. 
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Duties of disclosure are not the only possible way to address these 
scenarios. Other measures, such as guidelines on the conduct of the parties 
and arbitrators, could address the scenarios too. However, a duty of 
disclosure would probably be more effective. 
Fourthly, a duty of disclosure may delay the arbitration procedure. 
Complying with such a duty may take time, especially if the disclosure 
results in separate submissions or challenges. The duty would probably be 
worth the delay in most instances. When the information gives rise to 
submissions or challenges and thereby delays the procedure more 
significantly, the duty would arguably be particularly useful and necessary. 
In these instances, the arrangements give rise to concern for one reason 
or the other. Without the duty of disclosure, the arrangements could 
remain unknown through most or all of the proceedings. 
Furthermore, it would hardly take much time to comply with the 
duty. As explained in section 6 below, all it should take for a party to 
comply with the duty is to disclose the existence and identity of its funder 
in an email or a letter to its opponents, the arbitrators, and possibly an 
administering institution. Accordingly, this fourth alleged disadvantage is 
not a compelling reason to refrain from implementing a duty of disclosure. 
Finally, the duty might compromise the funded party’s duty of 
confidentiality towards the funder. A funding arrangement typically entails 
a non-disclosure agreement between the funded party and the funder. A 
requirement that the funded party discloses the funding arrangement puts 
the funded party in a dilemma. Either the party complies with its non-
disclosure agreement and fails to provide the information, or the party 
provides the information and breaches its non-disclosure agreement with 
the funder. 
Arbitrators face a similar dilemma. If an arbitrator cannot comply 
with its duty of disclosure under the applicable conflicts-of-interest rules 
without breaching a non-disclosure agreement, the arbitrator must either 
deny the appointment or breach the non-disclosure agreement. Similarly, 
a duty of disclosure for the funded party would force that party to (i) 
provide the information, (ii) sacrifice the funding arrangement, or (iii) 
breach the duty of disclosure and accept the legal consequences. 
Arguably, the funder should not need the party to keep the funding 
arrangement secret from other parties or arbitrators involved in the case, 
as long as they are all subject to non-disclosure agreements in relation to 
the arbitration. Accordingly, a duty of disclosure would probably be 
compatible with most funding arrangements as long as the arbitration is 
confidential. 
However, the arbitration is not necessarily confidential. Under 
Danish law, the arbitration is not confidential unless the parties agree to 
make it confidential. The Model Law, upon which the Danish Arbitration 
Act is drafted, contains no duty of confidentiality. To make the duty of 
disclosure as feasible and harmless as possible, the parties need to ensure 
that the arbitration is confidential. They can do so by reference to a set of 
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institutional rules or to national arbitration law under which the arbitration 
is confidential. 
4.3. NECESSITY 
It has been argued that the tribunal’s power to order document 
production renders a duty of disclosure needless.31 The tribunal can 
demand the submission of information on the funding arrangement 
through discovery or other types of document production. 
However, for the tribunal to demand the submission of certain 
information, the tribunal needs to know about the existence of the 
information. If the tribunal has no knowledge of the funding arrangement, 
it cannot demand the submission of information about the arrangement. 
Therefore, the duty could be a prerequisite for the tribunal’s decision to 
demand document production. Accordingly, the duty is necessary, despite 
the tribunal’s opportunity to order document production. 
Goeler argues that arbitrators and non-funded parties are likely to 
know about the funding arrangement even if the funded party has not 
explicitly made them aware.32 The argument does not seem convincing. 
Third-party funders may invest in any type of case and any type of party. 
The funding arrangement does not necessarily appear significant from any 
available facts or circumstances in the specific case, so the arbitrators and 
non-funded parties do not necessarily know about it. 
4.4. A DUTY OF DISCLOSURE IS FEASIBLE 
Balancing the arguments in the subsections above leads to the 
conclusion that a duty of disclosure is feasible and necessary. The duty 
would prevent many practical problems to which the parties’ possible 
funding arrangements may give rise, and it would not necessarily create 
any major problems. The duty would, therefore, be valuable to arbitration 
practitioners. 
However, the duty would only avoid creating other problems if it 
would take the obstacles mentioned in subsection 4.2 into account. 
Particularly, the concerns about confidentiality, efficiency, and party 
autonomy should be observed in this respect. The party’s duty to disclose 
information about a funder should entail a duty for the recipients of the 
information to keep the information confidential, and as clarified in 
section 6 below, the duty should be swift and easy to accommodate. 
5. HOW TO ADOPT IT 
The results of the analyses in the previous sections leave us with two 
major questions. How could a duty of disclosure be adopted, and how 
should it be constructed? The present section deals with the first question, 
and section 6 below deals with the second question. 
                                                        
31 Goeler (n 1) 133 ff. 
32 Goeler (n 1) 155. 
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When it comes to the adoption of the duty, three different 
opportunities could be considered. First, national legislators may 
implement the duty by law. Second, national or international organizations 
may implement the duty into soft law instruments. Third, arbitral 
institutions may implement the duty as part of their institutional rules. One 
opportunity does not exclude the other, but they will be dealt with 
individually in the following. 
The first opportunity is ideal, but it would be overly optimistic to 
believe that national legislators would change their arbitration laws and 
adopt the duty. Singapore’s and Hong Kong’s legislators have done so, 
but, in other countries, governments are hardly as progressive and 
dynamic when it comes to arbitration as in Singapore and Hong Kong. 
The second opportunity is realistic, but laying down the duty in soft 
law instruments would hardly have any direct effect on the parties’ 
willingness to disclose their funding arrangements. The IBA Guidelines 
already provide a duty for the parties to disclose relationships between 
their funders and the arbitrators, but the guidelines do not impose any 
sanctions on the party’s failure to meet the duty. The guidelines may have 
influenced the few legislators and institutions that are now implementing 
the duty into law or institutional rules, but soft law instruments as the IBA 
Guidelines do not seem to be influencing the conduct of the parties in any 
direct way when it comes to the disclosure of funding arrangements. 
The third opportunity seems realistic and effective. As private 
entities, the institutions are able to draft their rules as they wish. Compared 
with national legislators, the institutions have significant leeway and 
flexibility when it comes to rule-making and amendments. As mentioned 
in section 3 above, two institutions have already implemented 
amendments that require the parties to disclose the existence and identity 
of their funders, and the Danish Institute of Arbitration is now 
encouraging parties to disclose their sources of funding. 
Accordingly, the ball is in the institutions’ court. The institutions are 
realistically able to make parties disclose their funding arrangements, and 
they may do so in an effective, quick, and uncomplicated way. Institutions 
should not be concerned about implementing such duties. As mentioned 
in section 4 above, the duties would not do any harm if constructed 
properly. Parties can accommodate the duty without much effort, and 
third-party funders have no reasonable and legitimate interest in remaining 
unknown to arbitrators, non-funded parties, and administering arbitral 
institutions. 
6. HOW TO CONSTRUCT IT 
The only remaining question concerns the construction of the duty. 
What should it look like? A number of issues are relevant to consider in 
this respect. These issues include delimitations, the extent of information, 
recipients, the duty’s beginning and end, and the sanctions of breaching 
the duty. 
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As mentioned in subsection 4.2 above, there is no compelling reason 
to delimit the duty to certain types of funding. No matter whether the 
funding arrangement is an insurance agreement, a loan, an agreement to 
pay contingency fees, or any other type of arrangement, the need for 
disclosure is the same. 
Only funding arrangements related to the specific case should be 
disclosed. The parties need not disclose their insurance agreements and 
loans altogether, but only the ones that cover or depend on the specific 
case. Accordingly, the duty should encompass any funder who provides 
coverage for any kind of costs associated with the case or who might 
otherwise have a financial interest in the outcome of the case or an 
influence on that outcome. 
Information about the funder’s mere existence and identity may 
sufficiently enable the non-funded party, the arbitrators and any 
administering institution to accommodate the needs described in section 
4.1 above. In that case, it would be unnecessarily onerous for the party to 
disclose all available information about the funder and the funding 
agreement. Accordingly, the duty should require the party to disclose the 
existence and identity of the funder and, in  principle, nothing else. 
If the information about the funder’s existence and identity does not 
provide the necessary basis for decisions on challenges, security for costs 
or the allocation of costs, the duty might authorize the tribunal to demand 
further information as long as this is necessary and relevant. It may for 
instance be necessary for the tribunal to know the identities of the funder’s 
affiliates or the duration of the funding agreement. 
The information about the funder’s existence and identity is 
primarily relevant to the other parties and the arbitrators, but it may also 
be relevant to an administering arbitral institution. The institution may be 
involved in challenge decisions or decisions about the security for costs. 
Accordingly, the recipients of the disclosure should be all parties involved 
in the case as well as the arbitrators and any administering institution. 
As soon as a party has initiated arbitration and the funding 
agreement is concluded, the need for information about the funding 
arrangement has arisen. There is no need for disclosure of the funding 
arrangement before the initiation of arbitration. Accordingly, the duty of 
disclosure should run from the time when (i) a party has initiated 
arbitration, and (ii) the funded party has entered into a funding agreement. 
If the information about the funding arrangement remains unknown for 
too long, the problems identified in subsections 2.3 and 4.1 may appear at 
the time when the other parties and the arbitrators become aware of the 
arrangements. 
The consequences of breaching the duty may give rise to discussion. 
What sanctions would be effective, and should there be any sanctions at 
all? The right answers are straightforward. Arbitrators are subject to duties 
of disclosure too and, for arbitrators, the sanctions are provided by private 
law. An arbitrator may lose its fees or become liable for damages if the 
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arbitrator breaches the duty of disclosure. Similar sanctions should apply 
to the parties. If a party fails to disclose the existence and identity of its 
funder, the failure should affect the tribunal’s allocation of costs, and if 
the general requirements under national tort law are met, the failure should 
make the party liable for damages. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The increasing use of third-party funding is beneficial, but non-
funded parties and arbitrators need to be made aware of any funding 
agreement in the case. Without information about the funding 
arrangement, the arrangement may give rise to long and costly challenge 
procedures. Furthermore, the information about the arrangement would 
make it easier for the tribunal to allocate the costs and determine the need 
for security for costs. The information might also make it easier to keep 
the proceedings confidential. 
A duty for the parties to disclose the existence and identity of its 
funders would motivate parties to provide information about their 
funders. The duty would entail a number of disadvantages, but certain 
measures could mitigate these disadvantages. First, the party’s duty to 
disclose information about its funder should entail a duty for the recipients 
of the information to keep the information confidential. Second, the duty 
should be swift and easy to accommodate. 
It would be optimistic to believe that national lawmakers are ready 
to implement the duty into national arbitration laws. Soft law instruments 
would hardly be effective. The most effective and realistic solution is that 
arbitral institutions implement the duty into their institutional rules. They 
can do so in an effective, quick, and uncomplicated way. 
The institutes may construct the duty in numerous different ways. 
The best way would arguably be without limiting the duty to certain types 
of funding and without requiring disclosure of anything but the mere 
existence and identity of the funder. The funded party should provide the 
information to the other parties involved in the case as well as the 
arbitrators and any administering institution. The party should do so when 
the arbitral proceedings are initiated and when the funded party has 
entered into the funding agreement with the funder. If the funded party 
fails to comply with the duty of disclosure, the failure should affect the 
allocation of costs and, if the conditions under national tort law are met, 
make the party liable for any damages caused. 
 
